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Sunny start to the new semester (April 2023). Show image information

Sunny start to the new semester (April 2023).

Photo: Paderborn University, Besim Mazhiqi

Dr. Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Contact
Biography
Publications
Dr. Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Former - Research in the CRC901 "On-The-Fly Computing"

VCard

E-mail:
nadja.stroh-maraun(at)upb(dot)de
Web:
Homepage

Center of International Economics

Former

VCard

Dr. Nadja Stroh-Maraun
Miscellaneous
03.06.2020 - 31.08.2022

PostDoc - SFB 901 "On-The-Fly-Computing"
10/2013 - 04/2020

PhD in Business Administration and Economics

Thesis: “Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets”
10/2011 - 09/2013

M.Sc. International Economics, Paderborn University

Master Thesis: „Dynamic One-to-One Matching – Theory and a Job Market Application“
10/2008 - 09/2011

B.Sc. Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University

Bachelor Thesis: „Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme“
03.06.2020 - 31.08.2022

PostDoc - SFB 901 "On-The-Fly-Computing"
10/2013 - 04/2020

PhD in Business Administration and Economics

Thesis: “Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets”
10/2011 - 09/2013

M.Sc. International Economics, Paderborn University

Master Thesis: „Dynamic One-to-One Matching – Theory and a Job Market Application“
10/2008 - 09/2011

B.Sc. Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University

Bachelor Thesis: „Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme“

Open list in Research Information System

2020

Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets

N. Stroh-Maraun, Universität Paderborn, 2020

DOI


Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse

B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior (2020), 121, pp. 453 - 481

Abstract
DOI

We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.


2018

Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value

M. Feldotto, C. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6

Abstract
DOI

We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.


Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences

C. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters (2018), 170, pp. 39 - 41

Abstract
DOI

We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.


More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games

N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, J. Cox, Entertainment Computing (2018), 25, pp. 26-36

DOI


A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Journal of Consumer Behaviour (2018), 17(3), pp. 290 - 301

DOI


Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Managerial and Decision Economics (2018), 39(3), pp. 354 - 362

DOI


2017

Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse

B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017

Abstract
Download

In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.


2013

Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application

N. Stroh-Maraun, Master's thesis, Universität Paderborn, 2013


2011

Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme

N. Stroh-Maraun, Bachelor's thesis, Universität Paderborn, 2011


Open list in Research Information System

The University for the Information Society