Dr. Papatya Duman
PostDoc
- papatya.duman@uni-paderborn.de
- Phone:
- +49 5251 60-3889
- Office Address:
-
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn - Room:
- Q4.340
- Sprechzeiten:
Mondays, 14:30- 15:30 pm
Publications
Latest Publications
Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440.
Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story
P. Duman, Games 11 (2020).
The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
Show all publications
P. Duman, W. Trockel, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1 (2016) 83–106.