In January 2021, the GameStop stock was the epicenter of the first case of predatory trading initiated by retail investors. We use brokerage accounts to study who participated in this GameStop frenzy and how they performed. We investigate the extent to which investors’ personal and trading characteristics differ from the general population of retail investors. GameStop traders had a history of investing in speculative instruments, including stocks with lottery-like features. They were also more likely to close their positions before the peak of the bubble. At the onset of the frenzy, numerous retail investors also shorted GameStop. Overall, our results indicate that the GameStop frenzy was not a pure digital protest against Wall Street but speculative trading by a group of retail investors, in line with their prior high-risk trading behavior.

The containment of COVID-19 critically hinges on individuals’ behavior. We investigate how individuals react to variations in COVID-19 reporting. Using a survey, we elicit individuals' perceived infection risk given various COVID-19 metrics (e.g., confirmed cases, reproduction rate, or case-fatality ratio). We proxy individuals' risk perception with their willingness to pay for the participation in everyday life and amusements events. We find that participants react to different COVID-19 metrics with varying sensitivity. We observe a saturation of sensitivity for several measures at critical limits used in the political discussion, making our results highly relevant for policy makers in their efforts to direct individuals to adhere to hygienic etiquette and social distancing guidelines.

We study the relationship between risk managers' dark triad personality traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and their selective hedging activities. Using a primary survey of 412 professional risk managers, we find that managers with dark personality traits are more likely to engage in selective hedging than those without. This effect is particularly pronounced for older, male, and less experienced risk managers. The effect is also stronger in smaller firms, less centralized risk management departments, and family-owned firms.