Sie haben Javascript deaktiviert!
Sie haben versucht eine Funktion zu nutzen, die nur mit Javascript möglich ist. Um sämtliche Funktionalitäten unserer Internetseite zu nutzen, aktivieren Sie bitte Javascript in Ihrem Browser.

Paderborn University Show image information

Paderborn University

Photo: Paderborn University, Adelheid Rutenburges

Nadja Stroh-Maraun

 Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin - Research in the CRC901 "On-The-Fly Computing"

+49 5251 60-3367
+49 5251 60-3365
Office hours:

Wednesday, 2-3 p.m. (Please send an email in advance)

Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn
Postal Address:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn

10/2013 - today

PhD candidate and research assistant at the Chair of Microeconomics

Working title of thesis: “Dynamic Matching Mechanisms – Theory and Application”

10/2011 - 09/2013

M.Sc. International Economics, Paderborn University

Master Thesis: „Dynamic One-to-One Matching – Theory and a Job Market Application“

10/2008 - 09/2011

B.Sc. Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University

Bachelor Thesis: „Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme“

Open list in Research Information System


A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Journal of Consumer Behaviour (2018), pp. 290 - 301


Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value

M. Feldotto, C. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6

We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.

Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Managerial and Decision Economics (2018), pp. 354 - 362


Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences

C. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters (2018), pp. 39 - 41

We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.

More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games

N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, J. Cox, Entertainment Computing (2018), pp. 26-36



Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse

B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017

In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.



Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme

N. Stroh-Maraun, Universität Paderborn, 2011

Open list in Research Information System

The University for the Information Society